Research

Rival Donor: The Logic of Soviet Aid Allocation

Abstract: During the Cold War, the Soviet Union faced greater resource constraints than the United States and therefore could neither fully participate in foreign aid bidding nor afford to become the primary sponsor of a large number of developing countries. Its main objective was instead to promote the non-alignment of the Global South without directly antagonizing the United States, leading Moscow to adopt a reactive strategy of cautiously extending aid to regimes that demonstrated greater autonomy from their former colonizers and other Western powers. While leftist rhetoric alone was insufficient to attract Soviet support, the expropriation of foreign assets provided a credible and costly signal of non-alignment that preceded Soviet aid. As the United States responded to Soviet engagement by attempting to outbid its rival, Moscow sought to reward rulers demonstrating the greatest shift away from the West rather than enter a bidding competition it was unlikely to win. I evaluate this argument through original archival research, official Soviet statistics, periodicals, and memoirs of senior Soviet officials, and quantitative analyses of the extensive and intensive margins of Soviet aid.

Socialist Aid: Soviet Party Building Assistance in the Global South

Reindustrializing America: At What Price? — with Didac Queralt and Zagreb Mukerjee

Violent Aid: Perceptions of Security and Sovereignty in Mali-Russia Cooperation — with Charlotte Bednarski